Abstract. Based on the Agency Theory, this paper takes 366 listed companies on the GEM listed companies of China Between 2015 and 2017 as a sample, and uses the two methods of high-level management team incentives. Equity incentives and pay incentives are dependent variables, and the return on assets (ROA) is the independent variable, measuring corporate profitability. At the same time, considering the time difference between incentives and making appropriate operating decisions, this paper conducts a one-year and two-year lag effect test on executive incentives. The conclusion is that executive equity incentives and pay incentives have a positive impact on corporate performance. Executive equity incentives have a positive correlation with corporate performance in the lag period, while compensation incentives do not have significant correlation.
Introduction
The efficient development of an enterprise is inseparable from the rational and correct management decision-making and execution of senior management. Executives are the decision-makers of the business development strategy. In the modern corporate governance structure, the executive incentive mechanism plays an increasingly important role in the development of the enterprise, including equity incentives and pay incentives. The intensity of incentives affects the effectiveness of decision-making to a certain extent. Appropriate decision-making is conducive to better daily business activities, and strive to maximize shareholder equity and improve corporate performance. In previous studies, scholars often concentrated on pay incentives, but ignored equity incentives. More research is focused on management, while the senior management is relatively neglected. China's GEM is aimed at small and medium-sized, entrepreneurial and other types of enterprises, whose growth is not mature, and has a high growth. This paper takes the GEM listed companies as the research object, and explores the impact of executive equity incentives and pay incentives on corporate performance in order to enrich relevant research. Considering potential hysteresis effect, performance for one year and two years is implemented.
Literature and Hypotheses
Due to the separation of ownership and management rights, corporate shareholders tend to maximize their finances, while operators choose to increase their compensation and avoid risks. The asymmetry of information is likely to cause moral hazard and adverse selection in the case of inconsistent or even opposite interests of the shareholders and shareholders, thus deviating from its objectives. In order to coordinate the inconsistency of their interests, shareholders usually choose to adopt incentive measures to increase the pay and give more shares of the company, thereby stimulating executives to make strategic decisions that are truly suitable for enterprise development and reduce agency costs, thus improving business performance.
Study found a significant positive impact between executive pay and company performance, measuring company performance through shareholder returns and sales revenue growth rates (Murphy 1985 ) [1] . CEO pay incentives have a positive correlation with company performance (Mehran 1995) [2] . There is a strong positive correlation between company performance and CEO compensation, and that it is mainly caused by stocks and options held by executives (Brian and Jeffrey 1998) [3] . Through measuring ROA, ROE, Tobin Q and OF (owner fortune) as indicators to study the correlation between executive compensation incentives and corporate performance, research found that pay incentives have a positive correlation with the OF (owner fortune) during the recent two periods. Pay incentive has a positive impact on Tobin Q the last year, while it has a negative impact on the current period (Du and Wang 2007) [4] . Empirical research, conducted on 812 US companies, showed that the impact of CEO cash compensation and corporate performance was significantly improved when the compensation committee was stronger(Jerry and Steven 2009) [5] . By using R&D investment as an intermediary variable, research proved that the shareholding ratio of executives and pay played a positive role in corporate performance (Li 2017) [6] . Taking the panel data of listed companies in the manufacturing industry of China as a sample, The executive pay incentive has a positive impact on the enterprise's innovative R&D strategy, while the equity incentives and the innovative R&D strategy has a "U"-type correlation. The strategy has greatly promoted the innovation performance of the company (Cheng 2018) [7] . Based on the above literature research, this paper proposes the following hypotheses:
H1: Executive equity incentives have a positive impact on business performance. H2: Executive pay incentives have a positive impact on business performance. Since some of incentives are carried out at the end of the year, they may have less impact on the performance of the company in the current year, and the new management decisions for the next year or two will work. This paper proposes the following assumptions:
H3: Executive equity incentives have a positive impact on business performance during the lag period.
H4: Executive pay incentives have a positive impact on business performance during the lag period.
Variable Design and Model Construction Variable Design
(1) Independent variables. According to previous literature studies, this paper measures executive incentives through executive equity incentives and pay incentives. When executives are granted more equity interests, they will be closely linked to the company's development and stock trends. Executives with higher salaries are more motivated to take responsibility for managing the company and strengthen control and decision-making.
(2) Dependent variables. The return on assets reflects the net profit return received asset investment per unit and is used to measure the company's profitability. A higher ROA means that the company has achieved better results in increasing revenue and saving money. This paper uses ROA to represent company performance.
(3) Control variables. According to relevant research, Leverage ratio, firm scale, and company growth ability are often used as control variables. Year is to study the performance that lag one and two years. Due to the different degrees of development of different enterprises, different scales and different solvency, four indicators are used as control variables in order to ensure the validity and correctness of the research. 
Model Construction
Based on literature research and theoretical hypotheses, this paper constructs the following model:
Considering that the incentives implemented at the end of the year may need to play a role in the performance of the following year and the next two years, this paper builds the following model:
Empirical Research and Data Analysis Data Source
This paper selects 366 listed companies in the 2015-2017 GEM in China, excludes ST and *ST companies in 2015-2017, deletes the sample data of abnormal financial data changes, and removes the undisclosed samples of pay or equity incentive information. All data is derived from the CSMAR database, corporate financial statements and statement notes.
Descriptive Statistics
This paper provides a descriptive statistical analysis of variables. From the maximum and minimum, the differences in equity incentives and pay incentives among the companies on the GEM are quite different. This reflects the different attitudes of the company to the incentive mechanism of executives. At the same time, there are also situations in which the company only pays attention to incentives on the one side, such as paying attention to pay incentives with higher salary, instead of equity incentives, thus the proportion of executives that holds company shares is low. In 2016, both pay and equity incentives have declined. It may be due to the pressure of relevant industries in 2016 and the economic downturn, which has reduced incentives. It can be seen from the ROA and the control variables that the scale of the GEM companies differs and the development is not balanced, so there also exists different equity incentives and pay incentive mechanisms. 
Correlation Analysis
In this paper, Pearson coefficient correlation analysis is performed for each variable. The analysis results show that the three-year equity incentives and pay incentives have significant correlations with ROA, and the correlation coefficient of this year is the largest in three years, which enables multiple linear regression analysis. There is no significant correlation between equity incentives and pay incentives, indicating that equity incentives and pay incentives come from different aspects, and there is no significant correlation between the incentives of two. 
Regression Analysis
This paper conducts multiple linear regression studies on samples and performs regression analysis on enterprise performance with one year and two years of lag. The results show that equity incentives (INCENTIVE) and pay incentives (PAY) have a significant positive impact on corporate performance (ROA), with a larger equity incentive (INCENTIVE) coefficient and a more significant impact on pay incentives (PAY). H1, H2 hypothesis is valid. This shows that companies are paying more and more attention to equity incentives, and by attaching shares, the correlation between executives and the company's interests is closely linked. Pay incentives are the internal motivation of executives to take seriously the company's related business, so that executives are responsible for their own compensation. In terms of corporate performance that lags one or two years in equity incentives and pay incentives, study found that pay incentives did not have significant correlation, while equity incentives had significant positive correlation effects. H3 was established whereas H4 was not established. This may be due to the fact that in terms of pay incentives, remuneration of senior executives is relatively stable. Since most corporate remuneration is settled on a monthly basis, the lag effect is not significant. For equity incentives, they are unstable and untimed. The behavior of executives choosing to transfer holding shares is also uncertain, and may affect the performance of the next year or two. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper takes executive equity incentives and pay incentives as dependent variables, representing executive incentive mechanism, and uses ROA as the independent variable, which measures the profitability of the enterprise, thus showing the performance of the enterprise, controlling the leverage ratio, firm size, growth ability and year. This paper draws the following conclusions: (1) Equity incentives and pay incentives have a significantly positive impact on firm performance. The implementation of appropriate executive equity incentives and pay incentives can enhance executives' sense of responsibility to the company and reduce agency costs. (2) Equity incentives have a positive impact on corporate performance that lags one year and two years, while pay incentives have no significant impact on it. (3) In the internal analysis of the two dimensions of incentive mechanism, there is no significant correlation between equity incentives and pay incentives. In the incentive mechanism of enterprises to executives, equity incentives and pay incentives are not synchronized. According to the external market environment, the economic strength of enterprises and incentive preferences, different enterprises will choose different incentive schemes.
According to the relevant literature and research conclusions, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: (1) According to their own economic strength, enterprises formulate relevant executive incentive mechanisms from two aspects: equity incentives and compensation incentives, which contributes to enhance the effectiveness of executive decision-making, and reduce agency costs, thus improving business performance. (2) Enterprises can choose the appropriate incentive schemes in equity incentives and pay incentives. According to the research, the impact of equity incentives lasts longer, while the impact of compensation incentives is shorter, and the overall change is smaller. Therefore, in the year when the development trend of the enterprise is prosperous, it is necessary to measure which short-term incentives to carry out, or to implement a combination incentive mechanism of pay incentives and equity incentives.
